By David Pan · Monday, January 16, 2023 Telos 201 (Winter 2022): Civilizational States and Liberal Empire is now available for purchase in our store. Individual subscriptions to Telos are also available in both print and online formats.
 In concluding that “All political action has then in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or of the good society,” Leo Strauss describes an essential link between power and values. Because the power to make decisions about our future cannot be separated from the fundamental goals and ultimate meaning of our lives, we cannot exercise power that would be divorced from some set of values. Even the narrowest understanding of self-interest must come to terms with one’s own mortality and the meaning of others for our own existence. Consequently, raw power does not exist, as it can only be exercised within some understanding of its purposes.
When we consider the way in which power functions on a global level, it will also be crucial to understand how a world order will reflect a particular way of structuring the relationship between values and power. Even the seemingly most egregious use of power can only take place within the framework of an attempt to realize values in the world, and realist accounts of global order must also recognize the importance of some ideology such as nationalism as a means of establishing political values. Accordingly, discussions of balance-of-power dynamics can only begin once great powers emerge as a consequence of the political will of certain peoples to understand themselves in a certain way. Based on such measures as GDP, population, and military spending, Russia does not rank particularly well in relation to countries such as Brazil and India, neither of which pretends to great power status. If Russia can be considered a great power today, it is primarily because of the goals and values that its government embodies. Values form the foundations of global order, and Russia only continues to project its power because it maintains a sense of the global reach of its values for determining order for others.
Continue reading →
By David Pan · Monday, November 28, 2022 Populism has now arrived in China. As opposed to the 1989 protests driven by students as well as an intra-government political struggle, the current unrest, while including students, has been driven much more clearly by a broader mass of people who have grown frustrated with the bureaucratic overreach of the zero COVID policy. With the largest and most comprehensive system of bureaucratically organized surveillance, management, and domination of the populace in the world, China has certainly been ripe for such populist revolt. While the original theory of the new class was developed by Milovan Djilas in order to explain state socialism in the Soviet Union, the populist reaction to the new class has up to now been associated mainly with liberal democracies whose state bureaucracies are still relatively undeveloped when compared to the Chinese version. The Chinese state receded somewhat during the reform and opening up period, but the rule of Xi Jinping, the growth of the surveillance state, and especially the zero COVID policy have led to new extremes in the level of new class management of the population. Moreover, the lockdowns and their economic effects have highlighted the divide between the new class and the broader populace. As one protester shouted to the police, the police are state functionaries with stable incomes while most of the people are dependent on the flourishing of a market economy that has been throttled by the COVID lockdowns.
Continue reading →
By David Pan · Monday, September 26, 2022  By appealing to our common humanity, the idea of human rights and the idea of a “community of common destiny for mankind” promoted by the Chinese Communist Party seem to be referring to the same thing. Yet the two ideas are clearly opposed to each other, since the goal of the second idea is to supplant the first one. By opposing the idea of human rights and an existing international order that values the autonomy of nation-states and the rule of law, the Chinese Communist Party’s version of common humanity envisions a subordination of international order to Chinese power. One response to these opposing views of the meaning of common humanity would be to deny that such an idea might have any legitimacy at all and to then conclude that the only commonality we share would be a will to power. This stance, by denying the possibility of a common set of values, would undermine attempts at cultural exchange and comparison, as well as the legitimacy of any critique. The human rights ideal, by contrast, begins with recognizing, at a minimum, those transgressions that all humans seek to avoid, including torture, genocide, and enslavement. Such agreement provides the first step for a cultural comparison, which cannot begin until we define a common value. By defining such a value, it becomes possible to compare different manifestations of that value as well as to formulate a critique. In a follow-up to last week’s podcast with Sijia Yao, this week’s podcast with Xudong Zhang addresses the role of the idea of a common humanity for establishing the parameters of a cultural comparison between China and the West.
Continue reading →
By Telos Press · Monday, September 26, 2022 In today’s episode of the Telos Press Podcast, David Pan talks with Xudong Zhang about his article “China and the West: Methodologies for Comparison,” from Telos 199 (Summer 2022). An excerpt of the article appears here. In their conversation they discuss how the specific comparison between China and the West leads to new methodologies of comparison; how a thematic mode of comparison works to bring China and the West in relation to each other; how the need for both a closed horizon, indicating a kind of self-isolation, and a common humanity relate to one another; how comparison can be framed within a context of both movement and action; and how comparison links the particular to the universal. If your university has an online subscription to Telos, you can read the full article at the Telos Online website. For non-subscribers, learn how your university can begin a subscription to Telos at our library recommendation page. Print copies of Telos 199 are available for purchase in our online store.
Continue reading →
By David Pan · Monday, September 19, 2022 China has been intensively engaging with the West for over a century in its attempts to develop economic, political, and military power. At first limiting itself to appropriating Western technology, Chinese intellectuals eventually began to assimilate Western culture, literature, and ideas comprehensively, though of course doing so in a way that integrated them into their own cultural and political traditions. Its brand of communism, for instance, combines Western Marxism with forms of governance shaped by the long dynastic era of Chinese history. The Chinese assimilation of Western traditions establishes a basic openness to the West while also providing strategies for dealing with the West in times of conflict. On the one hand, China’s economic and political rise has been built upon a history of admiration for the West and the consequent ability to emulate Western practices. On the other hand, this intimate knowledge of the West has allowed China to take advantage of Western prejudices in order to undermine its structures, exploiting for instance the norms of free trade in a way that has undermined those very norms.
Continue reading →
By Telos Press · Monday, September 19, 2022 In today’s episode of the Telos Press Podcast, David Pan talks with Sijia Yao about her article “Third Term Comparison,” from Telos 199 (Summer 2022). An excerpt of the article appears here. In their conversation they discuss the difference between world literature and comparative literature, as well as the methodological advantages of comparison; the pervasiveness of biases in both Chinese and Western discourses about the other, and how these biases should be approached; the difference between a binary comparison and a third term comparison; how one can do a third term comparison; and how a third term comparison of D. H. Lawrence and Eileen Chang avoids the binary opposition between China and the West. If your university has an online subscription to Telos, you can read the full article at the Telos Online website. For non-subscribers, learn how your university can begin a subscription to Telos at our library recommendation page. Print copies of Telos 199 are available for purchase in our online store.
Continue reading →
|
|
